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Does the Constitutional Amendment Rule Matter at All?
Amendment Cultures and the Challenges of Measuring Amendment Difficulty
Tom Ginsburg & James Melton1
March 11, 2014

It is often asserted that the United States’ Constitution is the world’s most difficult to
amend.2 Depending on one’s normative perspective, this fact is either seen as a reflection of the
Constitution’s genius and a key to its endurance, or as a barrier to modernization. 3 But virtually
all observers agree on the basic fact of difficulty. The question is: how do we really know this? Is
it because the constitution has been amended infrequently over a long period? By that metric,
the Constitution of Japan of 1946, which has never been amended despite occasional proposals
to do so, should rank as the world’s most difficult. Is it because the U.S. process of amendment
involves multiple steps with high thresholds of agreement? It isn’t clear that Article V scores
highest on this metric, even if casual observation makes it seem as if the process is difficult.
Determining which constitutions are flexible and which are not is an important question.
Flexibility creates the conditions for constitutional stability. As noted by Alexander Hamilton, the
ability to remedy defects and unintended consequences of a constitutional text can make
constitutions more enduring.4 As political practices change over time, adjustments to the
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constitutional text keep it aligned with current practices and help ensure its continued relevance.
Amendments give the current citizenry a say in how they are governed., providing a mechanism
for each generation of citizens to consent to their constitution's edicts, potentially generating
greater attachment to the text, a critical requirement for the constitution to limit government
effectively.5 In sum, a flexible constitution should last longer and play a more important role in
governance than one that does not.
However, measuring flexibility presents tricky methodological issues. There have been
several valiant efforts to try to tackle this measurement challenge. This article elaborates on the
challenge and highlights the methodological tradeoffs involved. We also explain why several
proposed solutions—including our own in earlier work –, have flaws. We find that the various
metrics of amendment difficulty offered in the literature are poorly correlated, suggesting
potential validity problems. This illustrates a general challenge of institutional accounts of
constitutional behavior. Institutions surely matter, but institutional explanations are, like all
explanations, always partial. For some matters, behavior may be more driven by political or
social factors that can overcome the powerful force of institutional incentives. We argue that
amendment difficulty is an example of just such a matter.
As an alternative theory of amendment difficulty, we articulate the idea of an
amendment culture, which we argue is implicit in many accounts of constitutionalism more
generally. Cultural explanations have been out of fashion in the social sciences for some time, in
part because culture is difficult to measure and for too long was treated as a residual explanation
for phenomena that could not be accounted for otherwise. We seek to be a bit more rigorous.
Drawing on data from the Comparative Constitutions Project (CCP), we develop a simple
indicator of amendment culture and show empirically that this does a better job of explaining
observed patterns of amendment within constitutional systems than do any of the institutional
indices or variables on offer. Our article thus offers both a critique of the existing literature and
a way toward understanding why constitutional systems vary in their rates of amendment.
I. What is Constitutional Flexibility and Why is it Important?
Central to many notions of constitutionalism is the idea that some rules are more
entrenched, and hence of a higher order, than others. This is the rationale underlying the
designation of special procedures for amending constitutions that differ from the ordinary
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legislative process. Changing the constitution may require more steps, involve more actors, have
higher vote thresholds, or all of the above. As a result, constitutions are harder to change than
ordinary legislation and so can play their function of enhancing stability in the making of law and
operation of government. Entrenchment is at the heart of constitutional stability.
Yet we live in a time in which the rate of social and technological change is high and likely
to continue to accelerate. This may put great pressure on constitutional stability, which is at the
very core of the constitutional idea. Rules endure as long as they are useful, and so naturally
bear some relation with the underlying conditions of society. If society changes dramatically, the
rules may become brittle and out of date, leading to pressure to adopt new rules through
constitutional amendment, reinterpretation, or replacement.6
This observation has normative implications for constitutional design. Constitutions
adjust through two primary mechanisms, formal amendment and informal interpretation. If
demand for adjustment is going to increase, it might be advisable to draft constitutions that have
more flexible amendment provisions so as to allow more formal change. For our purposes, then,
flexibility refers to the ease of formal amendment provisions in a constitutional text.
Intuitively, observed rates of amendment should reflect the interaction of supply and
demand. Demand will reflect (generally unobservable) factors like the degree to which the
current constitution is out of sync with society, and the rate of social change. Supply, in our
conception, has two components: flexibility (again, of the formal structure), and amendment
culture.7
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See Daria Roithmayr et al., Should Law Keep Pace with Society? Available at
www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0709640104 (last accessed March 5, 2014).
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Another factor is the availability of substitutes. It is a commonplace to contrast formal constitutional
amendment with informal amendment. The United States Constitution, to return to a familiar example, is
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Formal and informal amendments are often treated as perfect substitutes; but of course some changes
cannot be undertaken by the judiciary or other actors. Further, there may be a culture of resistance to or
acceptance of judicial lawmaking that itself parallels the amendment culture. In other words, it is possible
to have a culture of frequent amendment and judicial lawmaking, as well as a culture in which neither is
found. India might be an example of the former dynamic; Japan an example of the latter.
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Along with our co-author Zachary Elkins, we have celebrated the virtues of what we
might call statutory constitutions: those with flexible amendment thresholds that are fairly
detailed.8 The constitutions of India, Mexico, and Brazil, to take three prominent examples, are
amended nearly every year. Such constitutions have the virtue of being frequently changed
through internal mechanisms, avoiding the more costly route of a total replacement.
Globally, constitutional amendment is very frequent. Figure 1 below shows, in the top
panel, the number of new constitutions passed in any given year. Roughly five countries per year
are writing a new constitution, but many more are engaged in amendment, as shown in the
bottom panel. The number of constitutional amendments promulgated around the world has
risen steadily since 1950. At present, approximately 30 constitutions are amended each year. 9
--Figure 1 here-II. Theoretical Explanations of Flexibility
One of the drivers of the increase in constitutional amendments, illustrated in figure 1, is
decolonization. Many new countries with constitutions were created in the 1960s and so the
absolute number of texts that could potentially be amended became much larger after World
War II. However, this does not explain the continued increases in the 1970s and 1980s. We do
not know whether these continued increases are the result of greater secular pressures for
change, changes in amendment procedures to make constitutions more flexible, or the
introduction of constitutions in places and times that are somehow more open to constitutional
amendment. This section focuses especially on the latter two stories, which are difficult to sort
out owing to methodological difficulties of measuring amendment ease cross-nationally.10 After
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Are amendments procedures becoming more flexible? Casual observation suggests that things are
moving in the other direction. Flexibility would point toward something closer to parliamentary
sovereignty, in which constitutional rules are passed in a manner that looks a lot more like passing
statutes than constitutions. Yet we have also observed a historical trend away from pure parliamentary
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exploring these challenges, we go on to develop a measure of amendment culture as an
alternative to institutional factors that constrain amendment.

A. Conceptualizing Amendment Difficulty
There is tremendous variation in the amendment procedures used from one country to
the next and often even across constitutions within a single country. Constitutions that require
numerous political actors and high voting thresholds should be more difficult to amend and,
hence, more entrenched than constitutions that lack such stringent amendment procedures.
Scholars have attempted to assess this intuition by measuring the rigidity of the amendment
procedure, which we will call amendment difficulty. The idea underlying measures of
amendment difficulty is deceptively simple: onerous procedures should lead to lower levels of
constitutional amendment. Such measures assume that the institutional barriers are
predictable determinants of stability or flexibility: if things like the political configuration, the
rate of environmental change, and the content of the constitution are held constant, we could
use a valid measure of amendment difficulty to predict how much constitutional change will
occur over a constitution's life span.
Operationalizing these concepts is hardly straightforward, however. The basic problem is
that the comparative flexibility of the hybrid set of procedural arrangements is not obvious ex
ante. For example, it is difficult to evaluate whether a constitution that requires a 2/3 vote of
the legislature to amend the constitution is more or less flexible than one that requires an
ordinary legislative majority with subsequent referendum by the public. We observe many
different kinds of amendment procedures involving different vote thresholds, combinations of
institutions, and sequences. Consider several sources of variation:


Steps to passage. The range of different models used in constitutional design is very
great. Bicameral and presidential systems will typically include approval by both houses
of parliament or an independently elected president. In Scandinavia, amendment usually
requires approval by two successive parliaments, or at least that the amendment be
proposed in a different parliament than that which approves it (Norway). Public approval
is an increasing popular requirement: some 40% of constitutions in force include such a
requirement. To summarize the design choices, amendments can require:

sovereignty, and toward more accountability institutions. If this is accompanied by greater legislative use
of supermajorities for constitutional change, then constitutions may be actually becoming more rigid.
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o

proposal by a particular actor or group of parliamentarians

o multiple readings in a parliament;
o passage by different parliaments with an intervening election;
o various levels of legislative supermajority;
o approval by the national executive
o public proposal or approval;
o constitutional court review;
o ratification by subnational governments;
o other institutional designs – e.g. the creation of constituent assemblies.


Multiple alternative procedures. Some constitutions will specify a number of alternative
procedures: for example the U.S. Constitution includes passage by legislative
supermajority and ratification by state legislatures as one method, and a constitutional
convection as another (never utilized) method. American states use constitutional
conventions more frequently to modify or replace their own constitutions. Finland
includes an ordinary procedure involving delay and an intervening election followed by a
2/3 vote, while also allowing an urgency procedure in which 5/6 of a single legislature can
approve an amendment without intervening elections.11



Substantive variation. Furthermore, a given constitution may not be consistent across
topics. The US Constitution, for example, requires a standard procedure for most topics
but effectively requires a unanimity rule for modifications to the principle of equal
representation of all states in the Senate. The drafters of India’s Constitution set up a
complicated amendment formula, by which some provisions can be amended by an
absolute majority in both houses of parliament with 2/3 present, and some require an
additional ratification by half of the states. 12 An additional set of individual provisions in
the Indian constitution can be modified by simple majority in parliament.

11

Bjorn Erik Rasch, 2003. The Constitution as an Instrument of Change. Stockholm: SNS forlag chapter
Rigidity in Constitutional Amendment Procedures, pp. 111-25, at 115.
12

Article 368.

7



Unamendability. Many constitutions have some provisions that are unamendable. Roznai
(2013) reports that 40% of constitutions have some provisions that are unamendable. 13
Some 11% entrench certain basic rights. In many other countries, courts have read
certain provisions to be unamendable.



Observed variation. We also observe tremendous variation in actual frequency of formal
amendment: the 1946 Constitution of Japan has never been amended; the Constitution
of India adopted two years later has been amended over 100 times.

These sources of variation make development of a cross-national comparative indicator
of amendment difficulty quite challenging, and perhaps even impossible, as a theoretical matter.
As long as more than one institution is involved, the relative difficulty of any alternative
procedure will depend largely on the configuration of preferences rather than the institutional
structure per se. To illustrate, consider two countries with the same amendment procedure, but
with different political configurations: one has a dominant political party that wants to change
the constitution and is able to do so regularly, while the other consists of a many small parties,
most of which oppose constitutional amendment. In this example, the political configuration
rather than the institutions explains the likely different outcomes.
Despite the challenges to comparing institutional features across countries, there are
strong reasons to try to develop a true indicator. One is that real world constitutional designers
face the challenge of writing an amendment rule. 14 They surely would value information on
which methods are relatively flexible and rigid, so as to inform the drafting decision. This has
prompted several scholars, including ourselves, to attempt to develop such an indicator ; these
indicators are listed in table 1. The remainder of this section explains the measures in table 1
and evaluates their validity.
--Table 1 here-B. Measuring Procedural Difficulty
Many of the efforts to date start with the observed rate of amendment in any given
system. Like amendment difficulty, the amendment rate is a deceptively simple concept: it
refers to the amount of constitutional change, or frequency of amendment, that results from

13

Yaniv Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments—The Migration and Success of a
Constitutional Idea, forthcoming, American Journal of Comparative Law (2013).
14

Our data show that an amendment rule is an essential feature of written constitutions, with over 98%
of documents in force having such a provision.
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formal constitutional amendments over some predetermined period of time. Measuring this
concept implies determining the total “amount of change" over some period of time and dividing
that amount by the length of time. This requires decisions about the period of time upon which
the measure is based and operationalizing the magnitude of constitutional change. 15 If
measures of amendment difficulty are based on measures of the amendment rate, each of the
aforementioned measurement decisions can affect the resulting measure of amendment
difficulty. (We return to these issues below).
The classic paper on the topic of amendment difficulty is by Donald Lutz.16 Compiling an
array of information on national and subnational amendment processes, he uses data on
observed rates of amendment from US states to calculate weights associated with different
procedures. He then applies these weights to formal provisions on constitutional amendment
for a set of democratic countries, developing an index in which the U.S. method turns out to be
the most rigid, while New Zealand’s is the most flexible.17 A later scholar, Astrid Lorenz, uses a
similar approach, but bases her analysis only on procedures in national constitutions. She also
restricts the analysis to the period from 1993 through 2002.18
Our own (“CCP”) approach follows Lutz in measuring ease of amendment using
information on both the observed amendment rate, and the formal amendment procedures of

15

When Lutz (1994) conducted his seminal study, there was little cross-national information about the
frequency of constitutional change. The Comparative Constitutions Project (CCP) has filled this
informational gap by creating a chronology of all constitutions and constitutional changes that have been
promulgated in independent states since 1789 (Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton 2009). The chronology
records all constitutional changes, or events, and divides the events that have taken place in each country
into systems, based on the introduction of “new,” “interim,” or “reinstated” constitutions. More
information about the CCP is available at http://www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/.
16

APSR 1994, reprinted in Levinson, ed. Responding to Imperfection (1995). See also John Ferejohn, “The
Politics of Imperfection” Law and Social Inquiry 22:501-31 (1997).
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control for global forces that might cause countries to pursue amendment. However, choosing a single
period of time to analyze forces one to compare constitutions of very different ages. This strategy also
poses an equivalency problem because old and new constitutions might be amended at different rates.
Since constitutional drafters' are less able to anticipate future events the further into the future they
look, this possibility seems quite likely. Like Lutz, Lorenz also restricts her sample to “true constitutional
systems”, meaning systems categorized as continuously democratic during her sample period. Lorenz at
348.
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each constitution. However, instead of modeling all amendments as equally difficult, we assume
that the first amendment passed in any given year is the most difficult. 19 This assumption is
based on a belief that the primary difficulty in amending a constitution is finding a coalition
willing to pass the amendment. Once the constitution is amended once, such a coalition is
identified and subsequent amendments are easier to promulgate.
Our approach differs from Lutz primarily in that we do not treat state and national
constitutions as comparable in light of their very different purposes and scope. 20 Further, we
use a slightly different method for developing the weights. Instead of drawing on the observed
rates of amendment from US state constitutions, we model the amendment rate as part of a
larger effort to understand constitutional change. We then estimate the effects of particular
amendment rules, net of other predictors. Thus, we regress the amendment rate on a set of
amendment procedure variables as well as on a host of factors that should predict political
reform more generally, including those factors included in our model of constitutional
duration.21 The unit of analysis in our model is the country-year, and the dependent variable is
binary, indicating whether or not one or more amendments were promulgated in a given
country-year.22 We use a conditional logit estimator to estimate the effect of several
amendment procedure variables on the probability of amendment: the number of actors
involved in various stages of the amendment process, the margin necessary to pass amendments
through the legislature, and dummy variables to indicate the role of different bodies in the
process. After estimating the model, we predict the probability of amendment by constraining
all variables except those related to the amendment procedure to their mean. The resulting
measure is available for all constitutions coded by the CCP. The predicted amendment rate varies
from 0 amendments per year to 0.92 amendments per year (with a mean of 0.19 and standard
deviation of 0.20).23
Like those of Lutz and Lorenz, our measure is partly endogenous in that it relies on
observed variation in amendment rates. Unlike other measures, however, we do take into
19

Lorenz, Astrid. 2005. “How to Measure Constitutional Rigidity: Four Concepts and Two Alternatives.”
Journal of Theoretical Politics 17(3):339-361.
20

See Tom Ginsburg and Eric Posner, Subconstitutionalism, Stanford Law Review; but see Mila Versteeg
and Emily Zackin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism Revisited, CITE.
21

Lorenz (2005) recommends roughly similar measures in another context.

22

For more detail see Endurance of National Constitutions (2009).

23

For a more thorough description of this procedure and the resulting predicted amendment rate, see
the online appendix at www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org.
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account social and political factors that are likely to put pressure on countries to amend the
constitution, because we extract our coefficients from a complete model of constitutional
replacement.
Note that our analysis does not take into account the problem of multiple alternative
procedures mentioned above. So long as the constitution includes a procedure, we incorporate it
into our analysis, regardless of whether it has ever been utilized in practice. To illustrate, our
weights for “constitutional convention called by subnational units” would be partly produced by
the amendment rate from the US constitution, even though that method has never been used. 24
Other, simpler approaches are possible if one builds an index based on theoretical
expectations about the relationship between the amendment procedure and the amendment
rate. The earliest such measure was created by Lijphart in his comparison of the Westminster
and consensus models of government. 25 Lijphart's measure is ordinal and based almost entirely
on the vote threshold required for constitutional amendments in the legislature. A supermajority
requirement greater than 2/3 is assigned a score of four, a supermajority requirement of 2/3
gets a score of 3, a supermajority requirement less than 2/3 gets a score of 2, and an ordinary
majority threshold gets a score of 1. Similarly, La Porta et al. measure the power and reach of
the judicial system for 71 countries and include a variable for “constitutional rigidity”.26 This
variable measures, on a scale from 1 to 4, how hard it is to change the constitution in a gi ven
country. One point each is given if the approval of the majority of the legislature, the chief of
state and a referendum is necessary in order to change the constitution. An additional point is
given for each of the following: if a supermajority in the legislature (more than 66% of votes) is
needed, if both houses of the legislature have to approve, if the legislature has to approve the
amendment in two consecutive legislative terms or if the approval of a majority of state
legislature is required. This is a simple measure but does not seek to empirically test its validity
or power, as it is developed in the context of a different research question.
24

One other note on the CCP measure. The variables related to the vote threshold required for an
amendment to pass in the legislature are among the only statistically significant variables in our model.
But our index does not account for statistical significance. Since most of the amendment -procedure
related variables in our model involve the number of actors, this suggests that the number of actors
involved in the process, and not the vote threshold, is probably driving the variance. In our model
reported below, we include some variables related to both the threshold and the number of actors.
25

Arend Lijphardt. 1999. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six
Democracies. New Haven: Yale University Press.
26

La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Christian Pop-Eleches, and Andre Shleifer.2004. “Judicial
Checks and Balances.” Journal of Political Economy 112(2): 445-470.
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Anckar and Karvonen also use this type of measure. 27 Like Lijphart, their measure is
ordinal, but unlike Lijphart, their measure accounts for both vote thresholds and the number of
actors involved in the amendment process. They differentiate procedures that use an ordinary
majority from a supermajority as well as procedures that require citizen involvement from those
that do not. The simplest procedure – i.e. ordinary majority in the legislature and no citizen
involvement – receives a score of two, and the most complex procedure – supermajority of both
legislators and citizens is required – receives a score of nine. Procedures which lie between these
two in terms of difficulty receive a score between 2 and 9. However, since virtually all
constitutions in their sample require supermajority support in the legislature for amendments to
be approved and few require supermajority support of the citizens, the pivotal distinction
according to their measure is whether or not citizens are involved in the amendment process. If
so, then the constitution receives a score of 6; if not, then the constitution receives a score of 5.
Of the 84 constitutions ranked by Anckar and Karvonen, 77% (65) receive one of these scores.
The final measure is the ordinal one produced by Rasch and Congleton.28 Like many of
their predecessors, they differentiate procedures based on the number of actors involved and
the legislative thresholds required. The easiest procedures only require a majority of the
legislature to pass and are assigned a 1. The hardest procedures require a supermajority in the
legislature and multiple actors are involved (i.e. a referendum, approval of subsidiary units, or
approval by a newly elected legislature) and are assigned a score of 4. For the two intermediate
categories, they assume the number of actors makes the procedure harder than requiring a
supermajority in the legislature. As a result, they assign a score of 2 when amendment only
requires a supermajority in the legislature and 3 when only a majority is required in the
legislature but multiple actors are involved in the process.
Existing measures of amendment difficulty are poorly correlated, indicating low levels of
convergent validity. Table 2 presents the correlation between each combination of measures.
Only three combinations yield a correlation greater than 0.5: Anckar and Karvonen with Lijphart,
Lijphart with Lorenz, and Lorenz with Lutz. The other correlations are all smaller than 0.5, and
the correlation between the CCP and Lorenz measures is even negative. Typically, in political
science, measures of the same concept tend to be highly correlated, which suggests a high
27

Anckar, Dag and Lauri Karvonen. 2002. “Constitutional Amendment Methods in the Democracies of the
World.” Unpublished Manuscript.
28

Rasch, Bjorn Erik. 2008. “Foundations of Constitutional Stability: Veto Points, Qualified Majorities, and
Agenda-Setting Rules in Amendment Procedures.” Unpublished Manuscript; Rasch, Bjorn Erik and Roger
D. Congleton. 2006. Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy: Analysis and Evidence, Volume 1.
The MIT Press chapter Constitutional Amendment Procedures, pp. 372-397.
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degree of what is called convergent validity.29 For instance, measures of democracy tend to be
correlated at levels of 0.8 or higher. 30 Based on this standard, one could argue that the low
correlations in table 2 demonstrate validity problems with extant measures of amendment
difficulty.
--Table 2-C.

Amendment Culture

While the profound methodological challenges that we articulate above suggest that the
standard efforts to measure amendment difficulty may never be fully adequate, the very fact
that the various institutional measures are so poorly correlated suggests that they are missing
something deeper. There is a possibility that any effort which focuses solely on institutions will
never fully capture the observed variation in patterns of amendment in different systems
because certain societal attributes, which we will call “amendment culture”, are more important
determinants of the level of resistance to constitutional amendments. 31
We define amendment culture as the set of attitudes about the desirability of
amendment, independent of the substantive issue under consideration and the degree of
pressure for change. In other words, there is a baseline level of resistance to formal
constitutional change in any particular system; as this baseline level increases, the viscosity of
the constitutional amendment process decreases even under identical institutional
arrangements.
Why might amendment culture exist? Start with the basic intuition common to virtually
all accounts of constitutionalism: barriers to amendment are not merely institutional. This point
is most clearly seen in the context of the British Constitution, in which the “constitutional” work
is done by conventions rather than by formal entrenchment.32 Similar stories are told in New
29

Convergent validity is only an indicator of validity if all of the highly correlated measures are valid
indicators of the underlying concept. It is possible that several measures of the same concept are highly
correlated but that all are invalid. Thus, convergent validity is necessary but insufficient to demonstrate
the validity of any given measure.
30

For instance, see Alvarez, Mike, Jose Antonio Cheibub, Fernando Limongi and Adam Przeworski. 1996.
“Classifying Political Regimes.” Studies in Comparative International Development. 31(2): 3-36 at 21.
31

On legal culture in a constitutional context, see, e.g., Vicki Jackson, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A
TRANSNATIONAL ERA 240-43 (2010); Xenophon Contiades, Constitutional Change Engineering, in ENGINEERING
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON EUROPE, CANADA AND THE USA 1, 3 (2013).
32

Anthony King, THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION (2007)
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Zealand and Israel, both of which have constitutional texts that, for the most part, can be
amended by ordinary legislative majority. In these countries, we are told, political barriers to
changing rules are the source of stability, and these political barriers function so well that
additional institutional protections are not needed (though as Stephen Gardbaum has pointed
out they have been introduced to some degree in recent years).33 This point, and the fact that
all these countries have functioning constitutional systems, suggest that entrenchment of certain
rules is not necessary for constitutionalism. That political constitutionalism is a possibility implies
some cultural barrier to a complete revision of the rules to benefit narrow partisan interests.
Now consider a system which does have institutional barriers to amendment, like the
United States. Even in this context, scholars have noted that there may be some drag on
proposing constitutional amendments simply because the label “constitution” communicates
that stability is desirable.34 This means that the forces limiting amendment are not merely
institutional, but related to political attitudes.
Suppose further that the political weight assigned to the value of entrenchment differs
across countries and constitutional cultures. If in some countries, the constitution is treated as a
sacred text, never to be touched except for matters of major importance, while in other
countries, the constitution is of little normative significance, we would observe different values
on entrenchment. If this is true, then the observed rate of constitutional amendment in any
particular country might reflect not only institutional factors, or the baseline pressures caused by
political and social change, but also these different weights ascribed to the constitution itself.
This is what we are calling amendment culture.
By using the term amendment culture, we are not asserting that attitudes about
amendment are immune to change. The normative value assigned to constitutional change
might vary over time even within a particular country, with political and social conditions. For
example, in the United States, we have observed constitutional amendments in waves: the Civil
War and Progressive era saw a number of amendments, while other eras of rapid social and
political change such as the New Deal and the Civil Rights Era did not. 35 Our argument is that
33

See Stephen Gardbaum, THE N EW COMMONWEALTH MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE
(2013).
34

Stephen M. Griffin, The Nominee Is . . . Article V, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES
51 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998). See also, Janet L. Hiebert, Limiting Rights: The
Dilemma of Judicial Review (1996).
35

Amy Myrick, Article V Advocacy on Fiscal Issues, 1900 through 2013, manuscript at page 5 (detailing
number of amendment proposals in Congress over time on fiscal issues.)

14

there may be cultural factors surrounding the degree of veneration of the constitution that will
affect either the number of proposals or the likelihood that proposals will be approved.
We do not fully articulate the determinants of these cultural factors. One might imagine
they may be responsive to institutional structure, so that a high amendment threshold will signal
to people that the constitution is sufficiently sacred that it is not to be changed. Alternatively,
the cultural factors could work against the amendment rule, in which a high threshold induces
political actors to propose many amendments, since few will be adopted. Conversely, a low
threshold might lead people to be cautious about constitutional reform, precisely because it is
easy; or might lead them to experiment with frequent “statutory” reforms. We set these
complexities aside for the moment, but expect that the particular relation between attitudes and
the amendment threshold will vary across time and space.
III. Assessing the Determinants of Flexibility: Amendment Difficulty and Culture
The previous section articulated two competing ideas about what might lead to a higher
or lower amendment rate in any particular time and space: institutional factors and cultural
factors. In the remainder of this paper, we set out to test the validity of these two explanations.
It is important to note from the outset that theories focusing on amendment procedures and
those that focus on amendment culture are not mutually exclusive; it is possible (and maybe
even likely) that both procedure and culture affect flexibility. However, the relative power and
validity of the respective factors has implications for both constitutional drafters and theories of
constitutionalism, which is the motivation for our analysis. Drafters will want to know whether
institutional design—the only factor within their direct control—can make a difference in
facilitating responses to environmental change. Constitutional theorists wrestle with the
mechanisms of constitutional change and the relative importance of formal constraints. 36
We test our conjectures about the importance of institutions and culture by statistically
analyzing the relationship between constitutional amendment rates and both the amendment
procedures in those constitutions and the amendment culture in the country where those
constitutions are in force. In the remainder of this section, we discuss how we operationalize
each of these concepts. The results are presented in the next section.
A. The Dependent Variable: The Constitutional Amendment Rate
As noted above, the constitutional amendment rate is simply the amount of change that
occurs within a constitution through the constitutionally prescribed amendment procedure.

36

Bruce Ackerman, WE THE PEOPLE (1990).

15

Several measures of the constitutional amendment rate exist, and each is based on the
frequency, or number, of amendments made to a constitution over some amount of time.
Notably, no existing measure of amendment rate considers the extent to which the constitution
is changed when operationalizing the magnitude of constitutional change. Indeed, all previous
measures of amendment rate operationalize the magnitude of constitutional change using the
frequency of amendment. Lutz and Lorenz both use the total number of amendments, and the
CCP uses the number of years when a constitutional amendment is promulgated.
These two approaches (Lutz/Lorenz and the CCP) make different assumptions about the
ease of amendment. The former assumes that each amendment is equally difficult to
promulgate. The latter assumes that the first amendment passed in a given year is the most
difficult. This assumption is based on a belief that the primary difficulty in amending a
constitution is finding a coalition willing to pass the amendment. Once the constitution is
amended once, such a coalition is identified and subsequent amendments are easier to
promulgate. Notably, no existing measure of amendment rate considers the extent to which the
constitution is changed when operationalizing the magnitude of constitutional change.
Existing approaches implicitly assume that all amendments, or amendment-years, are
equal. Needless to say, there is significant variation in the changes made by constitutional
amendments. For example, each of the amendments promulgated in South Korea since 1948
essentially overhauled the entire constitutional system, and some commonwealth countries -e.g. Canada and New Zealand -- have adopted bills of rights through constitutional amendment.
These are examples where much of the constitution was changed through constitutional
amendment. Other amendments are quite short. A 2009 amendment in Austria, for example,
read “In Article 87a, para. 1 the words “in matters of civil law" are excised.” 37 This changed the
adjudicative powers of certain administrative officials.
Even short amendments, of course, can have large consequences. For instance, in
response to the recent financial crisis, Spain promulgated an amendment in 2011 replaced
article 135 with six provisions on fiscal responsibility and the regulation of government debt.
The new article 135 will fundamentally change how the national budget is made in Spain.
These examples demonstrate that there is great variation in the extent to which
constitutional amendments change countries' constitutions. The extent of constitutional change
can be further analyzed by looking at the similarity between constitutional systems before and
after an amendment is promulgated. To conduct such an analysis, we calculated a measure of
37
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similarity using data from the CCP. For each question from the CCP's survey instrument, we
create a binary variable that is coded one if, for a given question, the same answer is given for
both constitutional events being compared. This yields 1,834 binary variables. The average of
these binary variables yields the similarity between any two events. We restrict the analysis of
these similarities to chronologically adjacent events, meaning that similarity is only calculated
when both chronologically adjacent events have been coded by the CCP. After this restriction,
we are able to calculate similarity between 1,252 events. The distribution of these similarities is
illustrated in figure 2.
--Figure 2 here-The most striking feature of Figure 2 is the percent of events with a similarity near 1. In
other words, the vast majority of constitutional amendments result in few changes to the CCP's
survey instrument. 28% (347) of the events analyzed have a similarity of 1, meaning that the
amendment did not change a single question on the CCP's survey instrument. Another 38%
(471) of events have a similarity score between 0.99 and 1, a range which indicates changes to
only a few of the variables (less than 1%) created by the CCP's survey instrument. The remaining
34% of constitutional amendments assessed resulted in changes to more than a few questions
on the CCP's survey instrument. This pattern corroborates the results reported by Elkins,
Ginsburg and Melton using more than ten times the number of amendments and a much more
sensitive measure of similarity. 38 It seems that most constitutional amendments do not change
many provisions in countries' constitutions.
Variation in the extent to which constitutional amendments change the constitution has
important implications for how we measure the amendment rate. Ultimately, we are interested
in how much change is made to the constitutional text through amendment. Variance in the
magnitude of change caused by individual amendments means that one large amendment can
affect a constitution's content as much as (or more) than ten smaller amendments. This makes
frequency of amendment a poor indicator of the magnitude of constitutional change.
Unfortunately, all existing measures of constitutional change focus on frequency, which might
cause those measures major validity problems.
In the analysis below, we use two measures. The first is the CCP measure used in Elkins,
Ginsburg, and Melton, which is based on the frequency of amendment. 39 The second is a new
measure that weights the frequency of amendment using the extent of changes made to the
38

The Endurance of National Constitutions. (2009) at 56.
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The Endurance of National Constitutions. (2009) at 99-103.
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constitution. Reversing the scale of the similarity index described above provides a measure of
the extent of change made to countries' constitution by each amendment. Summing the
reversed similarity index over a fixed period of time and dividing by the number of years in that
period provides the weighted measure.
To illustrate, the United States’ constitution, which has been in force for 225 years, has
27 constitutional amendments appended to it. The amendments were approved in 16 years –
10 amendments were promulgated in 1791 and 2 were promulgated in both 1913 and 1933.
Thus, according to the unweighted measure, the United States’ constitution has an amendment
rate of 0.07 (16 divided by 225), which indicates that the United States’ constitution is expected
to be amended 7 times for every 100 years of existence. The weighted measure is calculated in
a similar manner, but it takes into account the extent of the changes to the CCP survey
instrument that resulted from each amendment. We start by determining the proportion of the
CCP’s survey instrument affected by each amendment. For the United States, this is zero for
several amendments – those that occurred in 1895, 1804, 1919, 1933, and 1961. The largest
change to the CCP’s survey instrument resulted from the inclusion of the Bill of Rights in 1791,
which caused changes to more than 2% of the CCP’s survey instrument. To calculate the
weighted amendment rate, we sum these proportions for each year and divide by the age of the
constitution at its replacement or, if it is still in force, in 2013. For the United States,
approximately 4.7% (or 0.0471588) of the CCP’s survey instrument has been changed through
the 27 amendments, which yields a weighted amendment rate of .0002096 (0.0471588 divided
by 225). In other words, for every hundred years of existence the about 2% of the CCP’s survey
instrument is expected to be changed through amendments to the United States’ constitution.
We use this procedure for each constitutional system, yielding unweighted and weighted
measures of the amendment rate for each constitution. The unweighted amendment rate is
available for all constitutional systems, and the weighted amendment rate is available for 671
constitutional systems, 573 systems with no recorded constitutional amendments and 98
systems for which the CCP has coded all the amendments. These are the dependent variables in
the analysis below, which means that the constitution is the unit of analysis.
The distributions of the two measures are illustrated in Figure 3. The plot on the top is
for the unweighted measure and the plot on the bottom is for the weighted measure. The
modal value in both plots is zero. Perhaps surprisingly, most constitutions were never amended
– 58% (573).40 Even of those that were amended, though, most amendments changed very little
40

Notably, democratic constitutions (for definition, see footnote 33) are more likely to be amended than
non-democratic constitutions. Only 34% (249) of non-democratic constitutions were ever amended,
compared with 65% (166) of democratic constitutions. However, if one excludes those constitutions
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substance in the constitution. This is reflected in the figures by the fact that almost all of the
density in the weighted amendment rate measure is on the far left of the plot. Conversely, there
are a number of constitutions that score quite high on the unweighted measure because
countries like India and Brazil amend their constitutions almost every year. Of the constitutions
assigned an amendment rate using the new measure, Guinea-Bissau’s constitution of 1973 has
experienced the most change. Its amendment rate is 0.0068, which indicates that approximately
0.7% of the CCP's survey instrument (approximately, 58 variables) was changed by the one
amendment promulgated in the 11 years that the constitution was in force. Among
constitutions which have experienced at least one amendment, the constitutions with the lowest
amendment rates are Honduras’s 1965 constitution and Mexico’s 1857 constitution. Each was
amended multiple times, but no amendment led to any changes to the CCP's survey instrument.
--Figure 3 here-Notably, the weighted measure of amendment rate does not correlate strongly with
existing, frequency-based measures. The correlations between the weighted measure and the
unweighted CCP measure is just 0.48. This is a low correlation, but it is highly inflated by the fact
that most constitutions were never amended. If those constitutions are omitted, the correlation
decreases to 0.14. It is difficult to tell from this which measure is a more valid representation of
constitutional flexibility or if there are any validity problems at all. Perhaps both are valid but are
simply capturing different concepts. As a result, we take a conservative approach below and
estimate models using both measures of the amendment rate.
B. Measuring Amendment Difficulty
We have already indicated the problems associated with measuring amendment
difficulty using a single variable. Although such measures exist, they are plagued with validity
problems, as indicated by the low correlation between these measures. As a result, we
operationalize amendment difficulty using several variables that reflect different aspects of the
amendment procedure. Such an approach has the added advantage of allowing us to say
something about which aspects of the process affect the flexibility of the constitution.
We include four variables. Two are related to the actors involved in the process, one is
related to the vote thresholds required for the approval of amendments, and the last is about
the length of the process. The first two indicate the number of actors involved in the proposal
and approval phases of the process. We expect that more actors who can propose amendments
never amended, the average amendment rates between democratic and non-democratic constitutions
are about the same – 0.25 and 0.21, respectively.
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will increase the amendment rate and that more actors involved approval will decrease the
amendment rate.
The third variable indicates the threshold necessary for approving constitutional
amendments in the legislature. The values are 0.5, 0.6, 0.67, and 0.75, and we expect that larger
values lead to lower amendment rates. Note that we do not differentiate between chambers of
the legislature, although it is quite rare that the two chambers would have different voting
thresholds. For constitutions that do not specify a threshold for approving constitutional
amendments in the legislature, we assume that the normal procedure is followed and assign a
value of 0.5.
The final procedural variable captures the length of time required to pass a constitutional
amendment. Like all legislation, constitutional amendments take time, but some amendment
procedures require significantly more time to complete than others. Variance in the length of
the procedure has two effects. 41 The first is a mechanical effect: lengthy procedures leave less
time for the consideration of additional amendments. For instance, in Greece, amendments are
adopted by votes in two separate parliaments, meaning that an intervening election is required
for approval.42 As a result, it may take up to four year to promulgate a single constitutional
amendment in Greece, depending on when the amendment was initially proposed. The second
effect is that public opinion towards the amendment might change over time, either due to
changes in individuals’ attitudes toward the amendment or because opponents have time to
organize and to rally opposition to the amendment. Either way, longer procedures are likely to
mean fewer amendments over a constitution’s life span. To assess the effect of time delays, we
include a binary variable that indicates constitutions which require votes in more than one
parliamentary session.
C. Measuring Amendment Culture
Amendment culture is also a tricky concept to measure. To our knowledge, there have
been no attempts to develop a cross-national measure of amendment culture. Ideally, one
would have micro-level data (e.g. from a survey) on individual’s attitudes towards constitutional
change. Since such data does not exist, we are forced to use a proxy. We operationalize
amendment culture as the rate at which a country’s previous constitution was amended. In
other words, we lag the dependent variable. For countries’ first constitutions, we assign the
41
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measure a value of zero, since the amendment culture is unknown. This is not a perfect
measure of amendment culture because it will correlate with time-invariant country level
attributes, but it is the best we can do with existing data. Furthermore, our measure itself is not
time-invariant, so it does not reflect only features of the country.
D. Covariates
We include a number of covariates in our models. Perhaps most importantly we control
for the level of specificity of the constitutions – operationalized as length (in words) and scope.
More specific constitutions create more opportunities for drafters to make mistakes and
miscalculations. They also create more provisions that can possibly be amended. We expect
both measures of specificity to be positively correlated with the amendment rate. We also
include a binary indicator of judicial review. The measure assesses whether or not the
constitution provides judges the power of judicial review and is used to control for the possibility
that judicial review might be used as a substitute for formal amendments. The other covariate
we include in the model is year of promulgation, measured by century. We noted previously the
pronounced increase in the number of constitutional amendments since 1950. It is important to
control for this temporal trend in the analysis in case it is correlated with changes in other
independent variables in our model. Aside from these covariates, most models include region
fixed-effects to account for any spatial variation in the propensity of countries to amend their
constitutions.
IV. Results: Amendment Difficulty or Culture?
How well do amendment culture and amendment institutions predict observed
amendment rates?43 We answer this question by estimating a series of ordinary least squares
regression models, in which the unit of analysis is the constitutional system. Table 3 presents
the results. The dependent variable is the unweighted amendment rate in columns 1-4 and the
weighted measure of amendment rate in columns 5-9. For each measure of the amendment
rate, two models are estimated on two different samples, for a total of four regressions. The two
samples are the full sample of countries and a smaller sample of democratic constitutions only,
following the convention adopted by Lutz and Lorenz. 44 For each dependent variable and
43
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sample, we estimate one model with covariates and one without. Recall that the measures of
amendment difficulty are expected to have a negative, statistically significant effect on the
measures of amendment rate, and amendment culture is expected to have a positive effect.
--Table 3 here-The results are intriguing and consistent with our expectations. The best predictor of
constitutional amendment rates, it turns out, is what we have called an amendment culture, as
measured by the frequency of amendment in the country’s previous constitution. This is
particularly true of the first four models; in each, amendment culture has a large effect. When
we use weighted amendment rate as the dependent variable, though, amendment culture is
only significantly related to the amendment rate in democratic constitutions. Notably, the
coefficient estimates are quite large for the amendment rate, indicating both their statisti cal and
substantive significance.
The institutional variables are never statistically significant, and often, they do not even
have the sign one would expect. For instance, large vote thresholds are positively correlated
with the amendment rate, suggesting that higher vote thresholds actually yield higher
amendment rates. Similarly, requiring votes in multiple parliamentary sessions is associated with
higher amendment rates. The only procedural variable with the correct sign is the one indicating
the number of approving actors. More approvers decrease the amendment rate, but the
magnitude of the coefficient is not large enough to achieve statistical significance.
Some of the control variables in the model are also interesting. First, as expected, the
length of the constitution is positively correlated with the amendment rate. Length is a
significant predictor in model 3, where the unweighted amendment measure is used. In that
model there is expected to be about 1 additional amendment every 10 years a constitution
survives for every additional 1,000 words in the constitution. Scope is statistically significant in
the same model. For an increase from minimum to maximum scope, the expected number of
constitutional amendments is expected to decrease by 2.5 for each 10 years of a constitutions
life span. The effect of judicial review is also interesting. Surprisingly, the presence of judicial
review actually increases the amendment rate. Although the effect is only statistically significant
in model 4, the sign of the variable is consistent across models. This suggests that de jure judicial
review may not substitute for constitutional amendments, a finding that should be explored
further in future research.
during the constitution’s life span. We use the democracy-dictatorship measure of democracy created by
Cheibub, Jose Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland. 2009. “Democracy and
Dictatorship Revisited.” Public Choice. 143(2): 67-101.
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Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the models in table 3 demonstrate the difficulty of
attempting to predict a constitution’s amendment rate. The only consistently significant
predictor is amendment culture. None of the procedural variables have an effect, and the other
constitutional variables do not have a consistent effect across models. This problem is
particularly acute in models 5-9 where literally the only statistically significant variable is
amendment culture, which is only significant in democratic constitutions.45 From a
constitutional design perspective, this result is a bit depressing. The results suggest, quite
strongly, that constitutional designers have little influence over the observed flexibility of their
product.
V. Conclusion: Whither Amendment Culture?
This article has spent a good deal of time on technical issues of measurement, showing
that existing measures of amendment difficulty are poorly correlated and may not be valid. But
even more critically, we have suggested that a perfectly valid measure may not matter at al l in
terms of constraining or facilitating amendment. Our argument is that institutions are not the
primary determinant of amendment rates. At the end of the day, it is hard to disagree with
Rasch, who summarizes the situation by noting that the “empirical relationship between rigidity
and amendment is however not very robust.” 46
Instead, we argue, attitudes about amendments matter. Our main claim is that
something we are calling amendment culture exists and is important. There have been other
efforts to tie particular constitutional amendments to cultural concerns, even concerns about
the nature of writing and change. 47 But to our knowledge no one has articulated the idea of an
amendment culture at the level of a constitutional system.
Note that our measurement choice allows amendment culture to vary over time, and so
is not simply a reflection of unobserved national features that are fixed. It may be that
amendment culture is shaped by institutions, but with significant lags. Even so, the analysis
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We removed region fixed effects in model 9 to provide more degrees of freedom. With only 49
observations, it does not make much sense to include region fixed effects because some regions only
have data available for 1 or 2 constitutions.
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implies that less is in the control of constitutional designers than they might wish. It also further
establishes the stickiness of constitutional features; legacies matter.
One challenge to the idea of an amendment culture is that we observe variation even
within systems. In a federal system, sub-states often have their own constitutions and these can
be amended frequently. In the United States, state constitutions are amended much more
frequently than is the national constitution. Do state polities have their own amendment
cultures? This seems plausible, though we do not explore that question here.48
We also do not explore the strategic incentives that might be explaining from our result.
Suppose that designers believe that cultural barriers to amendment are high and so there will be
little pressure to amend the constitution. This might lead them to reflect those preferences in
the form of a rigid amendment rule. Alternatively, they might choose to opt for a very flexible
rule. Either way, the formal amendment rule may, in the end, not matter at all, or at least may
not matter in predictable ways across countries.

48
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VI. Tables and Figures
Table 1: Measures of Amendment Difficulty
Measure
CCP
Anckar and Karvonen
La Porta
Lijphart
Lorenz
Lutz
Rasch and Congleton

Source of Variation
Unclear
Actors
Threshold and Actors
Threshold
Threshold and Actors
Actors
Threshold and Actors

Mean
0.62
5.32
2.46
2.64
4.90
2.48
3.10

Standard Deviation
0.38
1.41
0.84
0.91
2.08
1.27
0.97

Range
0-1
2-9
1-4
1-4
1-9.5
0.5-5.1
1-4

Obs
450
84
71
35
42
32
20
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Table 2: Correlation Between Measures of Amendment Difficulty
CCP
1.00
(450)
Anckar and Karvonen 0.15
(78)
La Porta
-0.05
(56)
Lijphart
0.05
(34)
Lorenz
-0.29
(37)
Lutz
0.16
(31)
Rasch and Congleton 0.36
(19)

Anckar and La Porta Lijphart Lorenz Lutz Rasch and
Karvonen
Congleton

CCP

1.00
(84)
0.35
(27)
0.74
(31)
0.31
(39)
0.38
(25)
0.36
(18)

1.00
(71)
0.39
(24)
0.75
(22)
0.43
(25)
0.33
(19)

1.00
(35)
0.51
(25)
0.36
(26)
0.10
(20)

1.00
(42)
0.56
(22)
0.27
(18)

1.00
(32)
0.42
(20)

1.00
(20)
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Table 3: Regression Results
Variables
Amendment Culture

(1)
0.21*
(0.05)

(2)
0.26*
(0.09)

(3)
(4)
0.19* 0.26*
(0.06) (0.09)
0.02
0.15
(0.07) (0.16)
-0.01
0.00
(0.01) (0.02)
-0.01 -0.02
(0.01) (0.02)
0.03
0.05
(0.02) (0.04)
0.04
0.09*
(0.02) (0.04)
0.07*
0.05
(0.02) (0.04)
-0.26* -0.11
(0.13) (0.25)
0.01 -0.12*
(0.02) (0.05)
Democ Full Democ
Yes
Yes
Yes

(5)
0.17
(0.15)

(6)
0.42*
(0.07)

(7)
(8)
(9)
0.15
0.38
0.38*
(0.14)
(0.26)
(0.12)
Amendment Threshold
0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Number of Proposers
0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Number of Approvers
0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Multiple Sessions Required
0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Judicial Review
0.00
0.01
0.01
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Length (ln)
0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Scope
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Century of Promulgation
0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Sample
Full
Full
Democ
Full
Democ
Democ
Region FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Weighted Weighted Weighted Weighted Weighted
Dependent Variable
AR
AR
AR
AR
AR
AR
AR
AR
AR
R-squared
0.04
0.07
0.16
0.20
0.02
0.06
0.10
0.36
0.27
Observations
774
194
552
165
388
62
254
49
49
Notes: Cells contain the coefficient estimates and standard errors from 9 ordinary least squares regression models. Statistical
significance is indicated as follows: * = p(t = 0) < 0.05.
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Figure 1: Number of constitutional replacements and amendments per year
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Figure 2: Similarity of Constitutional Amendment with Prior Document
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Figure 3: Distribution of Unweighted versus Weighted Amendment Rate
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